�??History is more or less bunk.�?? - Henry Ford

One cannot overlook the cross-fertilization of ideas and technology across industries. Factory visits are not a new invention. The Springfield Armory, attributed by historians as the birthplace of �??The American System of Manufacture�?? (early mass production of interchangeable parts), entertained visitors in the early 1800�??s. The US Government even suspended patent rights on armory methods for a time to improve adoption of these new methods.

By default much of the history about �??Lean�?? manufacturing has surrounded the auto industry, with Ford and Toyota listed as the major players in the development of Lean. Learning the historical context should help you understand the principles. Their results were not the results of some secret formula or eureka moment in which they received divine inspiration. They both had significant competition in their early growth years, and had no obvious or outstanding advantage over their peers. One hesitates to use the term �??Urban Myth,�?? because many of the legends surrounding Lean are �??Industrial Strength.�?? While dispelling myths, the original reason for the research was to clarify the �??Whys�?? behind the evolutionary nature of TPS (Toyota Production System); it was not created in a vacuum. If we don't recognize the history and understand the application, we may be doomed to repeat this learning curve indefinitely.

Both Toyota, and Ford -- primarily for his success of the Model T -- could be classed as depending upon both luck and skill. �??Toyota�??s manufacturing system looks as if it were deliberately designed as a competitive weapon; it was created gradually through a complex historical process that can never be reduced to a managers�?? rational foresight alone.�?? Most readers are more familiar with the most recent Toyota and its fame

as the developer of Lean; Toyota points to Ford as their primary inspiration. This history is a reflection of their journey from obscurity to prominence.

Ohno�??s reflection in 1950, that Toyota took about 9 men to produce as much as a single man in the US auto industry. �?? By 1965, Nissan and Toyota had already matched or surpassed the productivity levels of American automakers. After the mid-1960�??s, productivity in Japan doubled in real terms as sales expanded. By 1980, Japan had replaced the United States as the largest automobile producing nation in the world, in technology as well as production volume�?��??  The history of the Japanese auto industry overtaking the American auto industry mimics Nature, where the victim has been overtaken before sensing the danger.

Coincidence plays a much larger part in history than most people realize. Nassim Taleb, a professional trader and mathematics professor, has written two books on this subject. In Fooled by Randomness, he examines what randomness means in business and in life, and why human beings are so prone to mistake dumb luck for consummate skill. And The Black Swan; a black swan is a highly improbable event with three principal characteristics: it is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was. Similar to a Perfect Storm.

If you are completely candid with yourself, you will soon discover how much your discoveries hinge on contingencies. Every now and then, when you happen to combine both boldness and skill, you may be able to exploit a few of the lucky situations that arise. But skill alone will not be enough, for much of the novelty in creativity is decided only when you are bold enough to thrust at chance.

One view that has been popularized represents Toyota as working against all odds. This is interpretation does not hold up when doing comparative analysis against their peers in Japan, or any of the other businesses in war-torn areas following World War II.

On a local level, they were as connected to the power structure as any industry in their region could be, and had a number of lucky breaks which others did not.

Ford had attracted to his factory a core of perhaps a dozen or a dozen and half young, gifted mechanics, none of whom had developed set ways of doing things. Encouraged by Ford, this group carried out production experiments and worked out fresh ideas in gauging, fixture design, machine tool design and placement, factory

layout, quality control, and materials handling. In a sense, the Ford production engineers took what was best from each approach to manufacture and overcame limitations to these methods by adding their own brand of production techniques.

This is not unlike Toyota�??s collective absorption of technology from any source available. How much of this strategy was deliberate on the part of either company is debatable; however, the results are proof of concept. In their most formative stages there was an active effort to ADOPT any best practice from any industry and actively keep looking, not accepting single results. The next stage was to ADAPT the best practice to their specific environment, even multiple versions which would match each process.  ABSORB -- they actually applied the information that they had learned. The last stage was to ANALYZE. Using the �??Lessons Learned�?? format they evaluated the performance and modified where possible to improve. Their next step was to adapt again, and again. This cycle works best when there is continual input from external sources. An analogy would be the merry-go-round on the children�??s playground. It stops if not continually pushed.